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FINANCIAL LIBERALISATION:
ITS RELEVANCE AND EXPERIENCES IN THE CARIBBEAN
Introduction
Financial liberalisation was widely implemented in most industrial countries over the last three 
decades. It resulted in the breakdown of barriers between the financial systems of these countries and 
those established in offshore centres around the world. These developments led to an increase in the 
pace of integration of financial markets through freer movements of financial resources. This trend 
has been reinforced in the 1980s and early 1990s by an increase in the rate of implementation of 
trade liberalisation programmes and the rapid increase in trade-related payments associated with the 
high rates of growth in world trade. These factors, together with the rapid technological 
developments which have greatly improved trade in financial instruments, served to strengthen the 
emergence of a global capital market. The increase in the liberalisation of restrictions on both 
domestic and international financial transactions is aimed at bringing about a number of benefits, 
including better opportunities for risk diversification, more possibilities to increase the rate of 
investment beyond the constraints of domestic savings and a more efficient mobilisation and allocation 
of resources in more competitive markets.
More recently, developing countries, including some Caribbean countries, adopted policies 
aimed at liberalising their financial systems mostly as part of the economic stabilisation and structural 
adjustment programmes. The adoption of financial liberalisation policies reflected efforts to improve 
competition in the domestic financial systems and attract more capital with the objective of 
establishing a more efficient system of mobilisation of resources as well as a better and more efficient 
allocation of these resources in the economies. The overall objective being to achieve higher rates 
of production and employment and higher standards of living.
In addition to the search for efficiency in the mobilisation and use of both foreign and 
domestic resources, liberalisation may have been encouraged by the realisation that the policies used 
to insulate the economies from international financial markets were becoming increasingly ineffective, 
especially those designed to retain resources in the countries. It is well known that large amounts 
of capital left developing countries despite the implementation of controls on both current and capital 
accounts of the balance of payments. Recent financial liberalisation policies may be reflecting 
attempts by the countries to adjust policies to the realities o f the international financial environment.
Immediately after their independence, most developing countries, including those of the 
Caribbean, thought that their underdeveloped financial systems would not necessarily respond to their 
development needs. Consequently, Jhey decided to intervene heavily in their domestic financial 
systems in order to ensure that the financial resources available went towards the financing of the 
priority areas identified in their development plans and/or to serve the needs of the low income 
sections of their populations, for example, small farmers, and assist in their policies of redistribution 
of resources. Interventions in the financial systems consisted mainly in directing credit towards 
particular industries, regions, a variety of State-owned enterprises, medium- and small-scale firms as 
well as low income communities in both rural and urban areas.
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The instruments used to give effect to these credit policies included subsided interest rates, 
quota allocation of bank loans and credit guarantees, among others. At the same time, extensive 
controls of capital flows were widely implemented to ensure that the internal system of controls did 
not break down as a result of competition from international financial institutions and that domestic 
financial resources were exclusively used to finance the priority projects identified in the development 
plans. Foreign exchange controls were also widely used and foreign exchange was allocated only to 
those imports which were deemed essential to the development of the countries.
In the early 1980s developing countries, including those of the Caribbean, became increasingly 
unable to finance their worsening balance of payments and fiscal deficits because of m ajor changes 
in the international financial environment, which involved, among other things, a sharp increase in 
interest rates. In an effort to remedy their macroeconomic disequilibria, these countries implemented 
structural adjustment and reform programmes supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). These reforms included policies 
designed to liberalise the domestic financial systems of these countries and, in some cases, included 
the lifting of restrictions on capital flows and the floating of exchange rates. Guyana, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago are some of the Caribbean countries which have been implementing extensive 
financial liberalisation programmes as part of their economic reform programmes. This paper 
examines the policies of financial restrictions and some of their economic implications. It also looks 
at the interrelationship of these restrictions with macroeconomic policies, with particular reference 
to Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. It then considers financial liberalisation in these three 
countries and draws some conclusions.
L Intervention in the financial system:
A widely used approach
The existence of externalities and other market failures and the widely held belief that these 
could be remedied by government action served as a basis for wide ranging interventions in the 
economies of both developing and developed countries. However, these interventions seem to have 
been used more extensively in developing countries. Some of the most popular interventions 
consisted of the imposition of numerous restrictions on trade and direct control of the State in many 
sectors of the economy. In the area of finance, the existence of a segmented market, the absence of 
a market for long-term finance, the rudimentary state of the financial sector, in general, prompted 
many developing countries to intervene extensively in their financial markets to stimulate investment 
and accelerate economic growth. The idea being that with sufficiently low interest rates, investment 
and its productivity would increase in the already identified key sectors and would contribute to the 
acceleration of economic growth and an increase in the general level of income in the countries.
The implementation of the programmes of intervention in the financial sector was intended 
to give the governments the power to allocate large proportions of bank lending in some of these 
countries. For example, 70 per cent of new bank lending in Pakistan in 1986 was directed by the
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Government and in Brazil Government credit programmes accounted for 70 per cent of credit 
outstanding to the public and private sectors in 1987. Credit programmes which were established 
as a result of the various systems of allocation of credit by governments were extensive and diverse 
aad included discriminatory rates of interest, different maturities and grace periods. The targets of 
these programmes were also diverse and encompassed agriculture, industry, tourism, housing, etc. 
These systems of intervention usually grew more complicated over the years and became increasingly 
hard to manage.
The means of intervention used by governments to direct credit generated in the financial 
system towards its already determined priorities included directives issued to banks to allocate a given 
percentage of their loan portfolio to a particular sector, for example, agriculture, industry, etc., or 
to fix interest rates usually at low levels for loans to particular priority sectors. In many instances, 
governments also established development finance institutions usually dealing with specific sectors, 
such as, agriculture, industry, etc., and specially oriented towards the provision of medium- to long­
term credit to the sector under their responsibility. In some instances, the intention was clearly to 
discriminate against the private sector in favor of the public sector with regard to the allocation of 
funds in the economy.
In addition, as part of their monetary policies some governments issued directives to banks 
to maintain a large portion of their assets at the Central Bank at very low or zero interest rates or buy 
government paper. These low interest rates inevitably affected deposit and loan rates in the rest of 
the economy and although they may have reduced the domestic component of debt service payment 
of the government, they may have served to reduce savings and promote inefficient investment. In 
some instances, the creation of money through lax monetary policies was used to finance fiscal 
deficits and served to fuel inflation in some of the countries, especially those in Latin America.
These government policies which were designed to allocate credit to priority sectors in the 
economy may have succeeded in ensuring access to credit by the targeted industries or entities. For 
example in Guyana, 56 per cent of non-governmental borrowing from domestic banks went to State- 
owned enterprises between 1983 and 1985. The same State-owned enterprises seem to have 
benefited from most of the foreign finance which was available to the countries and this is reflected 
in the share of these entities in the debt obligations of some developing countries. For example, it 
was estimated that more than half of the foreign debt of the Philippines and Zambia was accounted 
for by the State-owned enterprises of these countries1.
Credit directed towards export development was estimated to have increased substantially. 
In some instances, however, the target programmes may not have reached the intended beneficiaries 
because the system of subsidized interest rates resulted in credit rationing which usually favours the
1 World Bank, World Development Report, 1989.
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bigger and better known borrowers2. In the cases where resources reached their intended 
beneficiaries, their efficient utilisation was open to question. In the case of credit oriented towards 
export, for example, the anti-export bias which was prevalent in most countries, especially those with 
highly restrictive trading policies, may have worked against the development of export industries in 
these countries. The allocation of financial resources to projects which were not necessarily the 
investment with the best returns resulted in the misallocation of resources in the economies, while 
at the same time crowding out the sectors and projects which were not designated a priority.
At the level of the financial systems, the extensive intervention programmes for credit 
allocation and subsidized interest rates suppressed competition in the system by weakening both its 
allocation and mobilisation of resources functions. These measures, in turn, resulted in the weakening 
of the financial system and discouraged its development. The effects of these measures were 
reinforced by the wide use of foreign exchange and capital controls which acted as barriers against 
international capital markets. These controls were not very effective since they allowed large amounts 
of capital to flee the countries as a result of the search by citizens of these countries for asset 
diversification. They also seem to have played a role in discouraging capital flows to these countries.
Although economic growth is a complex process with many contributing factors, it is 
generally believed that administratively fixed low or negative interest rates, however attractive they 
may be to governments, are an inferior alternative to market related sufficiently positive real interest 
rates which are considered to be essential to the attainment of economic growth. Market related 
interest rates are the best option to achieve the three broad objectives of financial sector policies, 
namely to mobilise adequate amounts of resources both domestically and internationally, to provide 
a stable financial environment which will encourage development and to allocate credit to its socially 
most productive use3. However attempts to assess the effects of distorted capital markets on 
economic growth, taking distorted interest rates as a proxy, have not been conclusive. Some found 
a negative correlation between a measure of distorted interest rates and economic growth4 while 
others do not find any statistically significant relationship between real interest rates and GDP 
growth5.
2 C. Gonzales Vega. “Credit rationing behaviour of agricultural lenders: The iron law of interest rate 
restrictions” in D. W. Adams et al., Undermining Rural Development with Cheap Credit, (Special Studies in Social, 
Political And Economic Development Series), Boulder, Colorado, Westview, 1984.
3 See James A  Hanson, and Craig R. Neal, “ Interest rate policies in selected developing countries, 1970-1982", 
Washington D.C., World Bank, 1986.
4 R. Agarwala. “Price distortions and growth in developing countries”, Washington D.C., World Bank Staff 
Working Paper Na 575,1983.
5 D.R. Khakhate, “Assessing the Impact of interest Rates in Less Developed Countries”, IMF, Washington D.C., 
mimeo., 1985
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In some cases like Korea, directed credit programmes may have been successful to some 
extent but in most cases and especially in countries with extensive and complicated trade protection 
systems and an unstable macroeconomic environment, they may only have served to worsen the 
existing distortions in the economies and increase the economic costs associated with such 
distortions. In addition, these targeted credit programmes and subsidised interest rates may have 
discouraged the intermediation process and the creation of capital markets in these countries and 
weakened the financial system in general. One of the indications of these negative developments was 
to surface later in the form of unsustainably high levels of non performing loans in the banking system 
and financial development institutions which led to the many interventions of the central banks to 
rescue financial institutions which had clearly become insolvent. Directives given to both the banking 
systems and the development finance institutions to provide long term finance may have served to 
discourage the creation of capital markets in these countries.
Financial liberalisation, like financial restriction, has not been implemented without problems. 
The most widely quoted cases of financial liberalisation programmes running into trouble being those 
of Chile, Argentina and Uruguay in the late 1970s where the implementation of financial liberalisation 
policies led to high real interest rates, bank insolvencies, appreciation of the exchange rate and a 
deterioration of the balance of trade prompting all three countries to abandon their financial reforms. 
The failure of these financial liberalisation experiences was generally attributed to the implementation 
of financial liberalisation policies in the context of unstable macroeconomic environments and 
inadequate prudential and regulatory systems of the financial sector in the presence of moral hazard6.
H. Intervention in the financial sector:
The experiences of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
The financial systems of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago closely resembled those 
which existed in other developing countries at a similar stage of development. These systems 
comprised few financial institutions, usually commercial banks, providing mostly short-term finance 
for import and export purposes. Sources of medium- to long-term finance were either scarce and 
expensive or non-existent. The underdevelopment of the formal financial sector created a favourable 
environment for the establishment of informal financial systems characterised by high costs of capital. 
Regulations and supervision of the financial systems which existed in most cases were either poorly 
enforced or not adequate for the purpose.
Also the policies adopted and implemented to deal with these problems of the financial sector 
were by and large similar to those adopted in other developing countries to ensure that the financial 
resources available were channeled towards the implementation of their development plans. The 
stimulation of investment through easy access to credit was at the time thought to be more important 
for the attainment of economic growth and development than economic stability. The policies 
implemented included interest rates and credit controls, the allocation of credit to priority sectors, the
Carlos Diaz Alejandro. “Goodbye financial repression, hello financial crash”, Yale University 
Economic Growth Centre, Discussion Paper No. 441, May 1983.
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creation of financial development institutions and in the case of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, 
the establishment of stock exchanges to create a market for long-term finance.
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have over the years implemented various systems 
of interventions in their financial systems which included programmes of allocation of financial 
resources to various priority sectors and projects in their economies. These interventions were much 
more pronounced in Guyana where State control assumed much greater proportions than in the other 
two countries. The following section of the paper looks briefly at some aspects of these countries 
financial policies before the implementation of their recent financial reform programmes.
Before and during the implementation of its Economic Recovery Programme which started 
in 1988, deposit and lending interest rates as well as rates of treasury bills in Guyana7 were 
administratively determined and were largely negative in real terms, inflation rates having been always 
higher than the rates of interest. National deposit rates were 11.10% in 1987, 12 per cent in 1988 and 
15.8 per cent in 1989, largely exceeded by the inflation rates which stood at 29.4 per cent, 43.1 per 
cent and 61.3 per cent in 1987,1988 and 1989, respectively. The Guyanese financial system included 
banks especially geared towards the financing of specific sectors of the economy or providing 
financial services to communities deemed not well serval by other banks. In that context, the Guyana 
Cooperative and Agricultural Development Bank provided credit and technical assistance to 
industrial and agricultural projects using mainly government and donor funds. The Guyana National 
Cooperative Bank had objectives which included, among others, the extension of financial services 
to communities, mainly those in the rural area not served by the rest of the banking sector.
The system of supervision of the financial sector in Guyana was split between the Bank of 
Guyana whose responsibility included the supervision of the commercial banks and a body called the 
Cooperative Finance Administration (COFA) whose responsibilities included the supervision of the 
non banking financial institutions. There have been very few inspections carried out by either the 
Central Bank or COFA®. The Bank of Guyana comes under the authority of the Ministry of Finance 
and many of its decisions have to be approved by that ministry. There were no restrictions imposed 
on the Bank with regard to its lending to the government and this was used to facilitate government 
borrowing to finance its fiscal deficits. In addition, a large proportion of credit in the country was 
accounted for by the Government or the State-owned enterprises. Public sector credit represented 
more than 85 per cent of domestic credit for every year throughout the 1985-1995 period. Private 
sector credit, although not representing a high proportion of domestic credit has nevertheless been 
increasing over recent years.
The trade regime in Guyana was highly restrictive. In addition to the implementation of 
various structures of the Common External Tariff (CET) of CARICOM, Guyana’s trade regime
Data on Guyana taken from Inter-American Development Bank, Social and Economic Progress in Latin 
America, various issues
8 See World Bank, Guyana: From Economic Recovery to Sustained Growth, April 1992
■
included a complicated system of other charges as well as a number of tariff exemptions which were 
either part of the fiscal incentives offered and published or were at the discretion of the Ministry of 
Finance. Trade prohibitions as well as quantitative restrictions and licensing for both exports and 
imports were also in operation at various times before the economic reforms of the 1980s. Moreover, 
the exchange rate was fixed and became highly overvalued leading to substantial amount of capital 
flight despite the implementation of strict foreign exchange controls on both the current and capital 
accounts of the balance of payments.
The financial system of Jamaica was also the subject of numerous and elaborate systems of 
restrictions and regulations before the implementation of the latest set of financial liberalisation 
policies in the early 1990s. Interest rates in the country were administratively determined and floors 
and ceilings for these rates were fixed. Interest rates were sometimes below inflation rates like in 
198S when the national deposit rate stood at 21.31 per cent while the inflation rate was at 26 per 
cent. Specific sectors which were considered priority sectors by the Government were identified to 
benefit from preferential interest rates administered by specialised institutions or benefiting from a 
special refinancing scheme operated by the Bank of Jamaica. Various directives were given with the 
objective of discouraging the allocation of credit for consumption purposes and orienting financial 
resources towards targeted sectors such as tourism and agriculture. At one point in time, a 
preshipment financing scheme was established in Jamaica with the objective of promoting exports 
through the provision of easy credit. This was implemented together with an export guarantee 
scheme, however both were later abandoned. Jamaica established a Stock Exchange in 1969 as well 
as a number of development finance institutions to provide the missing market of long-term finance 
necessary for the development needs of the country.
The trade regime in Jamaica was restrictive. It operated a complicated system of tariffs and 
non-tariff barriers including the operation of a negative list, quantitative restrictions and licensing 
requirements. Payments restrictions on current account and controls on capital flows were used 
extensively. Jamaica experimented with a fixed exchange rate regime as a well as a dual exchange 
rate regime. A system of auction of foreign exchange to stabilise the exchange rate was later 
adopted and then abandoned in the face of pressure in the foreign exchange market. The present 
system of floating exchange rate was subsequently adopted. Jamaica experienced serious external 
and internal deficits which became increasingly difficult to finance. The financing of fiscal deficits 
through monetary expansion and public sector borrowing was tried and abandoned at various points 
in time after it became clear that it was having negative effects on public debt and inflation. Public 
sector credit was over 57 per cent of total domestic credit for both 1985 and 1986. Since then it 
declined steadily.
The difficulties and complexities of financial reform were reflected in the country’s attempts 
to reform its financial sector. For example, in 1985, a financial sector reform was implemented with 
the removal of restrictions on credit allocations and the levels of interest rates. However, pressure 
from rapid credit expansion, underpinned by undue expansion of money supply, brought about the 
reimposition of both credit and interest rate restrictions in 1989. The present reforms started in 1991 
and are still continuing.
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In Trinidad and Tobago, there was active government intervention in the financial sector. 
Interest rate controls were applied with maximum deposit rates and minimum lending rates 
administratively determined. Guidelines were issued to allocate credit to priority sect ors and limit 
loans to non-business purposes. There were also limits on loans to foreign-owned companies and 
lending to such entities were closely monitored by the authorities. In addition, a number of 
specialised financial development institutions, such as the Industrial Development Corporation, the 
Development Finance Company and the Agricultural Development Bank, promoted, through 
subsidise financing, small scale businesses, larger firms and agricultural businesses, respectively . An 
Export Development Company was also established to provide financial assistance and export 
financing at subsidised rates. In Trinidad and Tobago, the supervision of the deposit taking financial 
institutions as well as the non-bank financial institutions is the responsibility of the Central Bank of 
Trinidad and Tobago. More recently the country has established a Deposit Insurance Scheme to 
which all deposit taking institutions must contribute.
Credit to the public sector never represented a high proportion of total domestic credit but 
it seems to have been on the increase from the middle of the 1980s onwards. Loans from the Central 
Bank were used in certain cases to finance the budget deficit. Foreign exchange controls, though 
always in existence, have usually been employed more strictly during periods of balance of payments 
difficulties. These controls required the surrender of foreign exchange to the authorities and included 
guidelines for the allocation of foreign exchange sometimes by product category. Foreign investment 
and the repatriation of dividends and capital were subject to government approval. Trade protection 
was also widely applied as part of the import substitution model being pursued. The trade restrictions 
employed included the use of negative lists, licensing requirements, quantitative restrictions as well 
the prohibition of the imports of certain goods. Trinidad and Tobago operated a single fixed 
exchange regime most of the time except for the period 1985 to 1987 when a dual exchange rate was 
in operation. A floating exchange rate was introduced in 1993.
Putting aside the various differences between the three countries, it was clear that wide 
ranging interventionist financial policies were implemented in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago with the objective of channeling financial resources to pre-identified uses which were 
thought to favour improvement in productivity and the acceleration of development. These policies 
were also aimed at the development of the domestic financial sector and the improved access to 
finance by those sectors or groups of people, such as the rural poor. There is little doubt that in all 
three countries, financial resources were channeled towards those sectors, enterprises or projects 
which the government had selected. In addition, a large amount of financial resources went to the 
governments through high levels of reserve requirements or the purchase of government paper or 
borrowing from the central banks. Although it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these policies, 
there was widespread belief that these funds may have served to finance parts of the public deficits 
which these countries have been running over the years. Public deficits were particularly high in the 
case of Guyana where they stood at 58.8 per cent and 42.2 per cent of GDP in 1986 and 1987, 
respectively. The various schemes of subsidies through the financial system which were in operation 
in the three countries may have compounded their fiscal problems. The consistent and large deficits 
in the current account of these countries’ balance of payments required a steady flow of external
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resources which were becoming increasingly difficult to find. Also the low or negative rates of 
interest combined with the extensive programmes of directed credit may have led to suboptimal 
domestic savings which were inadequate to finance the required level of investment in the economies 
and which were reflected in the current account deficits of the balance of payments of these countries
Financial savings do not seem to have been encouraged by the low or negative interest rates 
which have existed in the countries. In fact, these may have encouraged the use of savings in the 
countries for the acquisition of physical assets. With regard to investment, the low or negative 
interest rates and the allocation of credit may have led to the financing of suboptimal investment 
because of the arbitrary selection of the investment projects. Since interest rates were usually held 
down artificially, some substantially loss making investment may have become profitable leading to 
the demand for credit outstripping its supply. This may have resulted in credit rationing which was 
usually carried out by administrative actions (rather than by prices) with the end result that less 
productive investments were approved and implemented. It has been estimated that the productivity 
of investment is higher in the countries with positive real interest rates than those with negative real 
interest rates9.
Distortions in these economies which may have been brought about by the trade restrictions 
implemented in the countries, added to the distortions resulting from intervention in the financial 
system, may have led to the channeling of financial resources to the less productive and sometimes 
value added subtracting investments. Low or negative interest rates combined with the fixed and 
overvalued exchange rates that the three countries were operating may have contributed to heavy 
outflows of capital despite the strict controls which were in operation in all three countries. It was 
estimated that the outflows of capital amounted to more than US$600 million for Guyana and 
US$837 million for Jamaica and US$896 million for Trinidad and Tobago between 1980 and 198610. 
Taken together, these policies did not serve to strengthen or diversify the financial systems as 
intended. Some banking institutions were on the verge of collapse, for instance, the Guyana National 
Cooperative Bank had to write off 1.4 billion Guyanese dollars or an amount much larger than its 
equity. Another Guyanese bank, the Guyana Agriculture and Industrial Development Bank of 
Guyana, carries 65 per cent non productive assets in its portfolio. Also, some commercial banks in 
both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago run into difficulties and had to be closed or restructured.
The Industrial Development Corporation, the Development Finance Company and the 
Agricultural Development Bank of Trinidad and Tobago experienced difficulties resulting from 
various factors including misallocation of funds, mismanagement and lax systems of controls etc. 
Nor were they as effective as they set out to be in meeting development objectives. In Jamaica and
9 See Alan Gelb and Patrick Hanohan, 1989. Financial Sector Reforms in Adjustment Programmes. Policy, 
Planning and Research Working Paper 169, Washington D.C., World Bank, Country Economics Department 
Processed.
10 Karl Bennet, Capital Flight and Caribbean Economic Policy. Paper delivered at the Workshop: Caribbean 
Economic Policy, Foreign Investment and Capital Flight. Institute of International Relations and the Mon etary Studies 
Programme 28-29 October 1994, U.W.I. St Augustine
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Trinidad and Tobago, stock exchanges have been established with the objectives of providing and 
strengthening a market for long-term finance and serving to fill a gap in the financial systems of these 
countries. These two stock exchanges are not yet well developed judging by the number of companies 
listed on the exchanges and the number of securities traded11. This is despite the tact that the 
Jamaican Stock Exchange has been in existence for more than two decades. The existence of these 
exchanges is nonetheless important for the future development of the financial system in these 
countries. The underutilization of the stock exchanges might be linked to the ownership structure 
of firms in the countries and their relatively easy access to bank credit. But macroeconomic policies 
and restrictions placed on the financial sector also played a role. The availability of external finance 
in the 1970s at low interest rates not only allowed the countries to ignore their worsening 
macroeconomic disequilibria, but also encouraged them to further worsen them. Most of the 
external financial resources were usually going to the public sector with government guarantees rather 
than the private sector on commercial criteria.
In the 1980s after experiencing major fiscal and balance of payments disequilibria and 
mounting external debt, caused by inappropriate economic policies including those related to finance 
and major changes in the international economic and financial environment - such as the oil price 
rises, the rise in interest rates, the decline in export commodity prices including oil and world 
recession12 - Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago implemented stabilisation and structural 
adjustment programmes which included financial liberalisation. The following section of the paper 
will examine briefly some aspects of the financial liberalisation in these three countries.
11 See Kelvin Sergeant, The Trinidad and Tobago Stock Exchange: Market Performance and Suggestions For 
Further Developments in” Insights Into An Emerging Financial Structure: The Experience of Trinidad and Tobago,” 
edited by Ramesh R arrisaran.
12 For a detailed analysis of the genesis of the macroeconomic disequilibria in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago see LC/CAR/G.404, Structural Adjustment and Privatization: An Examination of their Relationships in Four 
Caribbean Countries, December 1993.
11
in . Some aspects of financial liberalisation in Guyana,
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are the three Caribbean countries which have gone 
furthest with financial liberalisation. Among the three countries examined, Guyana13 is the one where 
State control was most prevalent. Here, like the other two countries, financial sector reform was 
undertaken along with other economic reforms. Guyana liberalised its interest rates which rose 
towards levels above that of inflation levels in certain years but remained negative in others. For 
example, the national deposit rate was at 15.8 per cent in 1989, well below the inflation rate for that 
year which stood at 61.3 per cent; in contrast it was at 22.5 per cent in 1992 well above the inflation 
rate for that year, which stood at 14.2 per cent. The treasury bill rate which came about with the start 
of treasury bills auction in June 1991 served as an anchor to interest rates in the country. The 
restructuring of the financial institutions, together with their privatization, was being implemented.
In addition, Guyana is implementing a vast programme of trade liberalisation and has 
liberalised transactions in both its current and capital accounts.
Fiscal policy in Guyana went through fundamental changes, including attempts to broaden 
the tax base and improve tax collection through, for example, an improvement in the functioning of 
the customs and excise department. These efforts at fiscal reforms, together with efforts to curtail 
spending, were showing some positive results. In 1993, the central government fiscal position 
improved significantly with an increase in current revenues of 16 per cent of GDP and a decrease in 
government expenditure of over 10 per centof GDP. The result was a central government current 
account surplus of 2 per cent of GDP. However, the overall deficit, although decreasing, remained 
high at 7 per cent of GDP in 1993 but lower than 1992 where it stood at 17 per cent of GDP. More 
prudent monetary policies were applied as part of the stabilisation programme with treasury bill sales 
used to manage credit and money in the economy.




Selected Economic and Financial Indicators 
Guyana
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
% change in GDP u 1.0 0.2 0.7 -3.0 -4.8 -3.1 6.1 7.7 8,2 8.5 5.1
Rate of Inflation 15.0 8.2 29.4 43.1 61.3 64.9 70.3 14.2 7.7 16.1 8.1
Balance of Payments u -96.6 -141.1 -109.5 -93.0 -113.3 -147.8 -118.0 -146.7 -137.9 -100.8 -94.9
Fiscal Balance a -56.1 -58.8 -42.4 -31.6 -6.6 -22.9 -15.6 -17.1 -6.0 -2.6
Exchange Rates * 4.3 4.3 9.8 10.0 27.2 39.5 111.8 125.0 126.7 138.3 142.0
Lending rates 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.1 18.9 32.8 33.6 28.7 19.4 18.4 19.2
National deposit rates 12.0 12.0 11.1 12.0 15.8 29.2 29.5 22.5 12.3 11.4 12.9
% change of money supply 18.9 19.0 51.3 57.1 39.5 54.5 65.5 31.5 32.0 10.4 16.7
Private sector credit as a 
% of total domestic credit
9.7 10.9 12.1 12.0 8.5 10.3 8.2 7.2 8.4 11.2 15.1
Public sector credit as a 
% of total domestic credit
90.2 89.1 87.8 87.9 91.4 89.7 91.8 92.8 91.6 88.8 84.9
u (At constant prices)
 ̂Cunent Account (in US$M) 
a (as a percent of GDP)
^ Exchange Rates to US$
Source: IMP Financial Statistics, ECLAC and National Data
Money supply has grown less rapidly over recent years. It grew by 10.38 per cent in 1994 
and 16.73 per cent in 1995 compared to 32.02 per cent in 1993. The fiscal position of the 
Government allowed it to become a net creditor to the Bank of Guyana. Exchange rate policy went 
through a fundamental change with the legalisation of the parallel market rate in 1990 and later the 
unification of the exchange rate in 1991. The Guyana dollar depreciated significantly, going down 
from GS39.5 to US$1 in 1990 to G$111.8 to US$1 in 1991 and G$142 to the United States dollar 
in 1995. Although it has fluctuated throughout this period, the Guyana dollar has been depreciating 
against the United States dollar. The Central Bank has been managing these fluctuations through 
interventions in the market either to sterilise flows or to inject foreign exchange in the market. In 
addition, reserve requirements have been used extensively by the Bank of Guyana to manage credit 
and money in the economy. These have been increased in 1994 from 11 per cent to 16 per cent of 
demand deposits and from 9 per cent to 14 per cent of time deposits reflecting a desire by the Central 
Bank to decrease the supply of money. Efforts by the Government to tighten monetary and fiscal 
policy over recent years seem to be succeeding in reducing the rate of inflation which increased 
substantially at the beginning of the reforms. It increased from 64.9 per cent in 1990 to 70 per cent 
in 1991 but then declined to reach 8.1 per cent in 1995.
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With regard to the supervision and regulation of the financial system which has been a major 
problem in Guyana, some measures have already been taken to strengthen this important area. Some 
of these measures were designed to improve the information from banks to allow for the control of 
prudential variables, while others concerned the recruitment of more qualified staff to undertake the 
supervisory functions necessary for the stability of a liberalised financial system. Guyana is also 
giving priority to the institutional reform of its financial sector. In that context, a Financial 
Institutions Act was passed which included guidelines for new bank licensing and limits on loans to 
any one single borrower. The legislation also aims at strengthening the financial system and 
encouraging the establishment of new banks and the more active participation of the private sector 
in the ownership of financial institutions. In fact two new banks, Demerara Bank and Citizens Bank, 
started operations in 1993. The Government of Guyana has also embarked on a vast programme of 
restructuring and privatisation of its financial sector. For example, steps are being taken to privatize 
the Guyana Bank of Trade and Industry.
In Jamaica14, the challenge seems to have been related to attempts to delink monetary policy 
from the financing of increasingly expanding government expenditures. In 1985-1986, policy 
decisions were taken to reform the financial sector. These policies included the removal of secondary 
reserve requirements and the use of government issued paper to finance the budget deficit. At the 
same time policies to improve the fiscal position of the country were implemented. Interest rate 
controls were removed as well as credit ceilings. In addition, the certificates of deposits which were 
introduced by the Bank of Jamaica in 1985 allowed the Bank to engage in open market operations 
during the period 1986-1988 mainly through the sale of these certificates to reduce money supply and 
reduce pressure on the exchange rate and the balance of payments.
Data on Jamaica taken from the Planning Institute of Jamaica, Economic and Social Survey and the 
Bank of Jamaica, Statistical Digest Various issues.
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Table 2
Selected Economic and Financial Indicators
1985 1986 1987
Jamaica
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
% change in GDPU -4.7 1.9 5.2 1.5 4.6 4.8 0.7 1.4 1.4 0.8 0.5
Rate o f  Inflation 26.0 14.7 8.4 9.2 16.5 22.0 8.4 17.9 34.7 46.5 16.1
Balance of Payments ̂ -304.4 -40.2 -137.0 32.1 -297.5 -340.1 -255.8 10.9 -194.2 183 -255.1
Fiscal Balancê -3.8 0.7 -2.3 -0.6 -2.8 -5.1 8.2 -3.4 -4.3 -2.4
Exchange Rates ̂ 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.7 12 12.1 23.0 24.9 33.1 35.1
Lending rates 21.9 23.0 23.0 23.0 25.2 30.5 31.5 44.8 43.7 49.5 43.6
National deposit rates 21.3 19.0 17.5 17.9 16.0 23.9 24.7 33.6 27.6 36.4 233
% change of money supply 15.23 40.78 5.23 52.97 -8.47 27.37 94.67 71.28 26.22 25.72 37.96
Private sector credit as a 40.3 41.4 59.4 81.2 95.9 111.9 139.1 115.1 114.4 117.3 103.0
% of total domestic credit 
Public sector credit as a 57.7 57.6 39.5 17.6 4.1 -12.0 -39.1 -15.1 -14.4 -17.3 -3.0
% of total domestic credit
 ̂(At constant prices)
* Current Account (in USSM)
 ̂(as a  percent of GDP)
* Exchange Rates in TJSS
Source: IMF Financial Statistics, ECLAC and National Data
Other measures taken during this attempt at financial sector reforms included the removal of 
stamp duties on transactions on securities as well as the elimination of withholding taxes on dividends. 
Also, a securities commission was established and a secondary market for government securities was 
created. However, this attempt at financial reform faltered in 1989 when secondary reserve 
requirements were reimposed together with credit ceilings most probably following pressure on the 
exchange rate and rapid expansion of credit in the economy. Another attempt at financial reform took 
place in 1991 when credit ceilings were removed again. Secondary reserve requirements were 
abandoned, but statutory reserve requirements were fixed at the very high rate of SO per cent, a clear 
indication of the desire of the authorities to keep the money supply in check. The latter financial 
reform included the liberalisation of the exchange control regulations.
There were efforts to improve competition in the system and enhance the quality and range 
of financial services available in the country. In that context, many non bank financial institutions, 
such as merchant banks and finance houses, were established most probably as a result of the 
adoption of more liberal policies towards the establishment of financial institutions. The operations 
of these institutions in the financial markets may have helped to decrease the concentration of assets
15
in the financial sector. The assets of the three largest commercial banks which were still high went 
down from 73.8 per cent of total assets to 64 per cent in 199415. However, the involvement of 
commercial banks in the ownership of other financial institutions may run counter to the objective 
of improving competition in the financial sector. Trade liberalisation has also been implemented in 
Jamaica opening up the current account of the balance of payments and allowing the free movement 
of capital. In 1991, there was a further liberalisation of exchange controls and the free convertibility 
of the Jamaican dollar was allowed.
Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies implemented at the same time as the liberalisation 
of exchange controls and the floating of the Jamaican dollar resulted in high rates of growth in money 
supply, high level of inflation and rapid depreciation of the local currency vis à vis the United States 
dollar. This loosening of both monetary and fiscal policies took place at a time when there was a 
fixed interbank exchange rate resulting in the creation of a parallel market for foreign exchange. At 
the end of 1993, action was taken to make the foreign exchange market more competitive through 
the removal of the fixed interbank exchange rate. This resulted in the disappearance of the parallel 
market. Since then, the Jamaican dollar has continued to depreciate mainly because of 
inconsistencies and sometimes reversals in fiscal and monetary policy. The floating Jamaica dollar 
does not seem to have stabilised even after the abolition of the interbank fixed exchange rate and 
attempts to tighten both fiscal and monetary policies. It depreciated from an average of JS33.08 to 
US$1 in 1994 to an average of JS35.14 to US$1 in 1995. Also, inflation remained high at 16.1 per 
cent in 1995 although substantially lower than its 1994 level of 46.5 per cent.
Interest rates, although fluctuating, remained very high reaching 67 per cent in April 1994 
in the case of lending rates. Average annual lending rates in Jamaica were 44.8 per cent in 1992, 
43.71 per cent in 1993, 49.46 per cent in 1994 and 43.58 per cent in 1995. The spreads between 
deposit and lending rates have also remained very high probably because of high reserve requirements 
some of which were maintained in non interest bearing instruments and high intermediation costs as 
well as oligopolistic conditions in the financial sector. The demise of the Blaise Merchant and Trust 
Bank, because of financial and supervisory problems, put into focus the need to look more carefully 
at the regulations and supervisory framework of the financial sector in Jamaica.
Jamaica did not seem to have been able to delink its monetary policy from its fiscal policy or 
to implement consistent macroeconomic policies. For example in 1993, fiscal policy was loosened 
considerably to pay for substantial wage increases awarded to certain categories of public employees. 
This decision along with others, such as the lowering of tariffs on imported vehicles and a decrease 
in income tax, contributed to an increase in the budget deficit which was eventually financed through 
the loosening of previously tight monetary policy. Money supply grew by 71.28 per cent in 1992, 
26.22 per cent in 1993 , 25.72 per cent in 1994 and 37.96 per cent in 1995. The targeting of the 
growth of a monetary aggregate ( M3 ) was largely overshot in 1993. Instead of the target of 16 per 
cent growth, M3 experienced a 36 per cent growth.
15 See Peart Kenloy: Financial Reform and Financial Sector Development in Jamaica in Social and Economic
Studies, Vol. 44,1995 Special Issue.
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Since the liberalisation of its capital account, Jamaica experienced at times inflows of foreign 
exchange which was mostly sterilised by the Bank of Jamaica to limit the growth of money supply 
and prevent pressure on the exchange rate. The sterilisation operations of the Bank of Jamaica, 
together with its sale of treasury bills to remove excess liquidity brought about by the sudden large 
increases in government expenditures, increased the level of domestic debt and pushed up the interest 
rates. In 1994, relatively more prudent fiscal and monetary policies were implemented leading to a 
decline of the yields of treasury bills from 52 per cent in early 1994 to 30 per cent at the end of that 
year. Commercial bank lending rates also declined from 60 to 46 per cent but were still very high. 
The high levels of reserve requirements which were fixed at 50 per cent for commercial banks, half 
of which have to be held in cash reserves, may have contributed to the high levels of interest rates 
prevailing in the country. The non bank financial institutions reserve requirement was fixed at 17 per 
cent of their deposit.
Trinidad and Tobago16 also undertook wide ranging financial reform measures as part of the 
stabilisation and structural adjustment programmes implemented in the country. The 1988 structural 
adjustment programme implemented in Trinidad and Tobago included some credit and monetary 
policies stipulations, such as constraints on credit to public sector entities and the progressive 
decrease in secondary reserve requirements from 11 per cent to 8 per cent. A restructuring of the 
banking and non-banking sector was initiated in 1989 when the Central Bank took over the 
operations of Workers Bank and its Trust subsidiary and most government shares in the Development 
Finance Company were sold. Later in 1993, three banks, the National Commercial Bank, Workers 
Bank and the Cooperative Bank were merged into one bank, First Citizens Bank. Interest rates 
controls have been eliminated and interest rates in Trinidad and Tobago are now largely determined 
by the rediscount rate of the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago and credit conditions in the 
economy.
Data on Trinidad and Tobago taken from various issues of the Annual Economic Survey of the 
Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago.
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Table 3
Selected Economic and Financial Indicators 
Trinidad and Tobago
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
% change in GDP 3 -4.5 -1.0 -6.1 -4.7 -3.9 -0.2 2.6 -0.5 -1.2 4.7 1.9
Rate of Inflation 7.7 7.1 10.8 7.8 10.5 11.4 3.8 6.5 10.7 9.4 5.4
Balance of Payments a -83.1 -433.5 -239.2 -117.8 -66.8 404.4 -20.7 122.6 67.3 239.4 193.0
Fiscal Balance3 -5.1 -5.9 -5.9 -5.7 -4.2 -1.2 -0.2 -2.8 -0.2 0.0 0.4
Exchange Rates 3 2.45 3.60 3.60 3.84 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 5.35 5.92 5.94
Lending rates 12.7 12.0 11.5 12.5 13.3 12.9 13.2 15.3 15.5 16.0 15.2
National deposit rates 5.3 6.0 6.0 . . . . 6.3 6.0 5.8 7.0 7.1 6.9 . . . .
% change of money supply -1.46 -8.28 4.68 -12.80 13.20 20.16 13.42 -7.72 16.33 19.50 4.67
Private sector credit as a 
% of total domestic credit
96.4 78.4 66.8 62.1 63.1 65.1 69.7 69.0 72.5 79.6 75.8
Public sector credit as a 
% of total domestic credit
-8.2 10.4 22.0 23.7 36.8 34.8 30.2 30.8 27.3 20.2 24.0
u (At constant prices)
* Current Account (in US$M)
* (as a percent of GDP) 
u  Exchange Rates in US$
Source: IMF Financial Statistics, ECLAC and National Data
In 1994, more restrictions on the credit market were removed. These included! the need for 
the approval by the Central Bank of lending to public sector institutions, restrictions on consumer 
loans, the removal of caps on commercial banks’ lending rates which were fixed at a maximum of 4 
per cent above prime lending rate and the stipulation for minimum downpayments and the maximum 
repayment period for instalment credit. In addition to these financial reform measures, a vast 
programme of trade liberalisation, which included the progressive elimination of the negative list and 
reductions in tariffs, was implemented and both payments on current and capital account were 
liberalised further.
The exchange rate liberalisation in Trinidad and Tobago was progressive starting with the 
removal of exchange controls on trade in services and capital flows in 1991. Most trade in goods was 
already free from exchange controls. The Trinidad and Tobago dollar which was floated in April 
1993 seems to have acquired a measure of stability after an initial depreciation. This stability was 
probably facilitated by the consistently tight fiscal and monetary policies pursued by the Government
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and the activity of the Central Bank, whose main focus has clearly shifted towards price stability 
including exchange rate stability. In 1993, this may have been achieved at the cost of a decline in 
Gross Domestic Product which registered a decline of 1.2 per cent in 1993. Inflation in Trinidad and 
Tobago increased from 6.5 per cent in 1992 to 10.7 per cent in 1993 most probably due to the 
depreciation of the exchange rate which took place immediately after it was floated. It then declined 
in both 1994 and 1995 where it stood at 9.4 per cent and 5.4 per cent, respectively. The tight fiscal 
policy pursued by the Government and the fiscal reforms undertaken resulted in an improvement of 
the Government fiscal position. This resulted in a deficit of 3 per cent of GDP in 1992 turning into 
a much smaller deficit of only 0.2 per cent in 1993 and a surplus of 0.4 per cent in 1995. The 
improvement in central government finances resulted in a decrease in the Central Bank’s credit to 
the Government and a decrease in domestic indebtedness. The growth of money supply over recent 
years has been moderate. It contracted by 7.72 per cent in 1992 and increased by only 4.67 per cent 
in 1995.
The instruments used for the management of a tendency of credit and money to increase in 
the economy were mainly the changing of the reserve requirements and the discount rate which stood 
at 13 per cent in 1993. In addition to the sale of treasury bills, reserve requirements were raised three 
times during 1994 from 16 per cent to 18 per cent of deposits and then from 18 per cent to 20 per 
cent with the objective of reducing liquidity in the economy. These actions were also aimed at 
relieving the pressure from the exchange rate. Over recent years, Trinidad and Tobago experienced 
a large inflow of capital resulting from the large foreign investment in gas, oil and petrochemical 
industries as well as foreign participation in the privatisation of public enterprises. But the recurring 
high levels of liquidity in the economy and the tendency of interest rates to decline may have led to 
an expansion of credit and higher levels of demand for foreign exchange putting downward pressure 
on the exchange rate from time to time, prompting intervention from the central Bank through moral 
suasion, the manipulation of reserve requirements and the sale of foreign exchange on the market. 
Interest rates have changed moderately over the years, experiencing a slight decline over recent years. 
Lending rates declined from 16 per cent in 1994 to 15.2 per cent in 1995 and deposit rates declined 
from 7.1 per cent in 1993 to 6.99 per cent in 1994. It is significant, however, to note that deposit 
rates in Trinidad and Tobago were below the inflation rate for both 1993 and 1994.
In an effort to strengthen the supervision and regulations of the financial system in the 
country, a Financial Institutions Act was passed in 1993 to enhance the regulations covering the 
banks and other financial institutions. In 1994, other legislative measures were taken to further 
strengthen the supervision and regulations of the financial system. These were the Financial 
Institutions (Prudential Criteria) and the Central Bank Amendment Act whose objectives were, in the 
case of the first, to ensure the safety and soundness of the financial system through the stipulations 
of limits and constraints on the activities of financial institutions in the country. In the case of the 
second, the objective was the strengthening of the supervisory functions of the Central Bank.
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Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago implemented restrictive financial policies with the 
aim of strengthening their financial sectors and channeling the financial resources available to those 
investments which were considered more productive and more likely to increase output, employment 
and the standard of living of their people. Increased investment through easy and low cost access to 
financial resources was considered the best medium to rapid industrialisation and economic growth. 
Controls on credit and interest rates were used extensively not so much to stabilise the monetary and 
financial system but to promote investment in the economies. These various interventions in the 
financial sector which were part of a wider system of intervention in the economies proved 
unsustainable since the allocation of funds to the most productive sectors was not the priority. 
Accordingly, banks and development finance institutions which play an important role in the 
development process of the countries found themselves saddled with debt and carrying large 
portfolios of non-performing loans. Credit was still not available to targeted sectors, especially the 
small- and medium-scale firms and the low income groups of the community; inflation rates reached 
high levels in both Guyana and Jamaica; exchange rates were overvalued and had to be devalued 
many times leading to unstable prices and capital flight. It is as a result of these countries’ economic 
problems that adjustment and economic reform programmes, including financial liberalisation, were 
implemented. This time macroeconomic stability became the main objective of monetary and fiscal 
policies, since that stability was now generally considered to be essential for the effective performance 
of the financial system and long term economic growth.
Financial liberalisation in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago is still in its early stages 
and there is little doubt that policies implemented to carry out this liberalisation have contributed to 
the tensions of various intensities experienced by the economies of these three countri es. Jamaica 
is still grappling with macroeconomic instability and changes in the direction of its monetary and fiscal 
policies seem to have put into question the credibility of these policies. In addition, that country is 
still experiencing balance of payments and fiscal deficits of various magnitudes. The exchange rate 
of the Jamaican dollar has not yet stabilised and the high levels of interest rates and high spreads 
between lending and deposit rates which exist in the country cannot be favourable to investment and 
economic growth. Moreover, inflation is still high and prices unstable. The financial liberalisation 
programme of Trinidad and Tobago seems to have fared better, so far. The country had applied 
consistently tight monetary and fiscal policies since the start of its economic and financial reforms. 
The budget deficit seems to be under control and the current account of the balance of payments has 
been positive since 1992. But despite these policies, there seems to be a recurring downward 
pressure on the exchange rate requiring frequent interventions of the Central Bank.
In Guyana, macroeconomic policies seem to have tightened considerably and the change from 
a State controlled to a market economy seems to be progressing well. Reforms are clearly bearing 
fruit and this is reflected in the lower fiscal deficits, lower growth of money supply and lower inflation 
rates especially in the last two years. However, both the fiscal and balance of payments account 
remain in deficit and the exchange rate seem to be still depreciating against the United States dollar.
Conclusion
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The central banks of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago do not possess a high level 
of independence and their financial systems are not fully developed and display inefficiencies, such 
as credit market segmentation and cartelisation. All three countries have taken steps to deepen their 
financial systems through the creation of new markets and the introduction of new financial 
instruments. Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago being more advanced than Guyana in that respect. 
Although exchange rates of the three countries are officially floating, their central banks seem to be 
intervening frequently in an attempt to maintain the exchange rate stability vis à vis the United States 
dollar. Most of the interventions seem to be aimed at preventing the exchange rates from depreciating 
too much against the United States dollar. This may indicate the use of the exchange rate as an 
anchor to the price system although Jamaica targeted a measure of monetary aggregate (M3) in 1993. 
The use of the exchange rate as an anchor to the price system may reflect the tight relationship which 
is thought to exist between the exchange rate and the price system in high import dependent 
economies. In addition, all three countries have taken steps to restructure and strengthen the 
supervisory and regulatory framework of their financial systems.
Financial liberalisation seems to have been widely implemented around the world, further 
strengthening the globalisation of financial markets. It is generally believed that the liberalisation of 
both the domestic financial sector and financial flows with the outside world are essential if a country 
is to take full advantage of the opportunities available in a global financial market. However, 
financial liberalisation entails transitional costs which will be greatly increased if policies are not 
properly sequenced and coordinated. The lack of success of some experiences with financial 
liberalisation and the difficulties experienced by Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in 
managing their financial, liberalisation programmes hold useful lessons for those Caribbean countries 
which seek to embark on their own liberalisation which will become increasingly necessary.
The countries of the Caribbean which are already highly integrated in the world economy 
judging by their generally high levels of trade to GDP may gain from orienting their reforms towards 
a more competitive domestic financial sector and a more open external financial sector. This should 
not mean that countries should rush towards the liberalisation of their financial sectors, but rather that 
they should carefully plan the policies which are likely to minimise the disruptive effects of the 
liberalisation process while allowing them, at the same time, to take advantage of the opportunities 
which may be made possible by the emerging global capital market. It is generally agreed that a 
liberalisation programme should not be undertaken until a large measure of macroeconomic stability 
has been achieved, including careful and effective management of the money supply and the fiscal 
account. This should then be followed by the liberalisation of trade and the domestic financial sector 
and finally the liberalisation of the capital account. Regulatory and supervisory functions assume a 
special importance in ensuring the stability and soundness of a liberalised financial system. Also, 
such a system requires more independent central banks staffed by highly qualified staff* to carry out 
the necessary supervisory and regulatory functions and run monetary policy in an increasingly 
sophisticated financial world.
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